Tax·Luxury

Part VI · Cases & Precedents · No. 03

Notable art tax cases

Five decades of Tax Court and federal appellate decisions on art and collectibles valuation, fractional-interest discounting, investment intent and charitable-deduction valuation — plus two non-litigated matters that practitioners cite for the tax consequences of legal restrictions on sale and of fraud in the art market.

Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), aff’d, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975) — blockage

The estate of the sculptor David Smith held a large inventory of his works at his death. The Tax Court accepted that a “blockage” discount applies where offering a large body of similar works on the market at once would depress prices below what individual sales would achieve. The case is the leading U.S. authority for applying blockage to an artist’s estate.

Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996) — fractional interests and QTIP property

The decedent held undivided fractional interests in assets, while the remaining fractional interests were held in a QTIP trust from his predeceased wife and included in his estate under §2044. The Fifth Circuit held that the interests should not be merged for valuation, so a fractional-interest discount could apply to the interests the decedent owned outright. The case is frequently cited in fractional-interest planning for real estate and tangible property.

Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner, 767 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014) — fractional interests in art

James Elkins and his wife had held 64 works of art, including works by Picasso, Pollock and Cézanne, and his estate held fractional interests in them. The Tax Court (140 T.C. 86 (2013)) allowed only a nominal 10% fractional-interest discount of its own devising. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the only evidence in the record — the estate’s uncontradicted expert testimony supporting much larger discounts — had to be applied, and ordered a refund (reported at about $14 million plus interest). The decision is the leading authority for fractional-interest discounts on art.

Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970) — investment intent

Charles and Jayne Wrightsman claimed deductions under §212 for expenses of their art collection, arguing it was held for investment. The Court of Claims held that the collection was held primarily for personal pleasure and social purposes, so the expenses were not deductible. The case continues to frame the collector-versus-investor distinction for art expenses.

Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 872 (1983), aff’d, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985) — charitable-deduction valuation

The taxpayer donated unmounted colored gemstones to a museum and claimed a deduction based on retail jewelry prices. The Tax Court held that fair market value had to be measured in the market in which such unset stones were most commonly sold — sales to jewelers and dealers, rather than retail sales of finished jewelry — and sharply reduced the deduction. The case is a standard authority on identifying the relevant market for donated tangible property.

The Sonnabend estate and Rauschenberg’s Canyon (settled 2012)

The art dealer Ileana Sonnabend died in 2007 owning Robert Rauschenberg’s Canyon (1959), which incorporates a stuffed bald eagle. Federal wildlife law prohibits sale of the eagle, so the estate’s appraisers valued the work at zero. The IRS valued it at $65 million and asserted about $29.2 million of estate tax plus about $11.7 million of penalties. The matter settled in 2012 without litigation: the heirs donated the work to the Museum of Modern Art, claimed no charitable deduction, and the IRS dropped its claim. It is not a reported decision, but it is a much-cited illustration of the tension between a legal bar on sale and the willing-buyer/willing-seller standard.

The Knoedler forgeries

The 165-year-old Knoedler Gallery closed in 2011 amid revelations that it had sold dozens of forged Abstract Expressionist paintings supplied by the dealer Glafira Rosales, with total sales of about $80 million. In September 2013 Rosales pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to wire fraud, money-laundering and tax offences, including filing false tax returns and failing to report a foreign bank account; she was later ordered to pay about $81 million in restitution. The case is cited for provenance and due-diligence failures, and for the tax and foreign-account reporting charges that accompanied the fraud.

Significance and synthesis

Primary Sources

  1. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), aff’d, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975).
  2. Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
  3. Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 86 (2013), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 767 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014).
  4. Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
  5. Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 872 (1983), aff’d, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985).
  6. United States v. Rosales (S.D.N.Y., guilty plea September 2013).
  7. 26 U.S.C. §170, §170(f)(11), §6662(e), (h).

Reviewed October 2026